Islamic bank in Indonesia

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Kompas.com reports in a story titled, “Islamic Banking in Dire Need of Bankers”, published on Wednesday December 9, 2009:

JAKARTA, KOMPAS.com — Islamic banking is impeded with regulations, permits, capital, and the more serious one is the lack of bankers. Deputy Director of Bank Indonesia Syaria Banking, Mulya Effendi Siregar, reminded that the lack of bankers is one reason why the operations of some islamic public banks have been delayed.

Among operational islamic banks, the limited number of bankers has caused a hijacking war. In several months of operations, some bankers have already moved onto other new syaria banks.

According to Mulya, the hijacking war is normal for a growing industry. “According to the data, the human resources needed for islamic banks is up to 22,000 personnel. But so far only 14,000 are available.”

An islamic banker, who wishes to remain anonymous, stated that the lack of human resources in islamic banking is especially on the directional level. “I moved because I want a more lucrative opportunity. It’s like swapping an old shirt that’s too small with a new one that fits.” This senior banker moved to a new islamic bank recently launched a few months ago.

Another banker who plans to swap his banner is Ismi Kushartanto. Unfortunately, the former high official of BNI’s Islamic Business Unit wasn’t willing to reveal which syaria bank he’ll be moving to. He only said that he had passed the fit and proper test of Bank Indonesia, two months ago.

Regarding his new salary and reason of resignation, he was also unwilling to reveal. Banking authorities claim to have endeavored so that this human resource issue doesn’t become a lasting stigma. But so far the efforts have been in vain. (Ruisa Khoiriyah/Kontan/C17-09)

Islamic banking is growing and is here to stay

Research Report on Islamic Banking – Part 4 – Glossary, Appendix and References

by Mohamed Ariff, University of Malaya, taken from Asian-Pacific Economic Literature, Vol. 2, No. 2 (September 1988), pp. 46-62

Glossary

al-wadiah = safe keeping

bai’muajjal = deferred-payment sale

bai’salam = pre-paid purchase

baitul mal = treasury

fiqh = jurisprudence

Hadith = Prophet’s commentary on Qur’an

hajj = pilgrimage

halal = lawful

haram = unlawful

ijara = leasing

iman = faith

mithl = like

mudaraba = profit-sharing

mudarib = entrepreneur-borrower

muqarada = mudaraba

murabaha = cost-plus or mark-up

musharaka = equity participation

qard hasan = benevolent loan (interest free)

qirad = mudaraba

rabbul-mal = owner of capital

riba = interest

Shariah = Islamic law

shirka = musharaka

Appendix

Islamic Financial Institutions (outside Pakistan and Iran)
Australia Islamic Investment Company, Melbourne.

Bahamas Dar al Mal al Islami, Nassau Islamic Investment Company Ltd, Nassau, Masraf Faisal Islamic Bank & Trust, Bahamas Ltd.

Bahrain Albaraka Islamic Investment Bank, Manama, Bahrain Islamic Bank, Manama, Bahrain Islamic Investment Company, Manama, Islamic Investment Company of the Gulf, Masraf Faisal al Islami, Bahrain.

Bangladesh Islamic Bank of Bangladesh Ltd, Dhaka.

Denmark Islamic Bank International of Denmark, Copenhagen.

Egypt Albaraka Nile Valley Company, Cairo, Arab Investment Bank (Islamic Banking Operations), Cairo., Bank Misr (Islamic Branches), Cairo, Faisal Islamic Bank of Egypt, Cairo, General Investment Company, Cairo, Islamic International Bank for Investment and Development, Cairo, Islamic Investment and Development Company, Cairo, Nasir Social Bank, Cairo.

Guinea Islamic Investment Company of Guinea, Conakry, Masraf Faisal al Islami of Guinea, Conakry.

India Baitun Nasr Urban Cooperative Society, Bombay.

Jordan Islamic Investment House Company Ltd Amman, Jordan Finance House, Amman, Jordan Islamic Bank for Finance and Investment, Amman.

Kibris (Turkish Cyprus) Faisal Islamic Bank of Kibris, Lefkosa.

Kuwait Al Tukhaim International Exchange Company, Safat., Kuwait Finance House, Safat.

Liberia African Arabian Islamic Bank, Monrovia.

Liechtenstein Arinco Arab Investment Company, Vaduz, Islamic Banking System Finance S.A. Vaduz.

Luxembourg Islamic Finance House Universal Holding S.A.

Malaysia Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad, Kuala Lumpur, Pilgrims Management and Fund Board, Kuala Lumpur.

Mauritania Albaraka Islamic Bank, Mauritania.

Niger Faisal Islamic Bank of Niger, Niamy.

Philippines Philippine Amanah Bank, Zamboanga.

Qatar Islamic Exchange and Investment Company, Doha, Qatar Islamic Bank.

Saudi Arabia Albaraka Investment and Development Company, Jeddah, Islamic Development Bank, Jeddah.

Senegal Faisal Islamic Bank of Senegal, Dakar, Islamic Investment Company of Senegal, Dakar.

South Africa JAAME Ltd, Durban.

Sudan Bank al Baraka al Sudani, Khartoum, Faisal Islamic Bank of Sudan, Khartoum, Islamic Bank of Western Sudan, Khartoum, Islamic Cooperative Development Bank, Khartoum, Islamic Investment Company of Sudan, Khartoum, Sudan Islamic Bank, Khartoum, Tadamun Islamic Bank, Khartoum, Jersey The Islamic Investment Company, St Helier, Masraf Faisal al Islami, St Helier.

Switzerland Dar al Mal al Islami, Geneva., Islamic Investment Company Ltd, Geneva, Shariah Investment Services, PIG, Geneva.

Thailand Arabian Thai Investment Company Ltd, Bangkok.

Tunisia Bank al Tamwil al Saudi al Tunisi.

Turkey Albaraka Turkish Finance House, Istanbul, Faisal Finance Institution, Istanbul.

U.A.E. Dubai Islamic Bank, Dubai, Islamic Investment Company Ltd, Sharjah.

U.K. Albaraka International Ltd, London, Albaraka Investment Co. Ltd, London, Al Rajhi Company for Islamic Investment Ltd, London, Islamic Finance House Public Ltd Co., London.

The list includes Islamic banks as well as Islamic investment companies but it does not include Islamic insurance or takaful companies.

Source: Siddiqi (l988)

References

Abdallah, A., 1987. ‘Islamic banking’, Journal of Islamic Banking and Finance, January-March, 4(1): 31-56.

Abdeen, A.M. and Shook, D.N., 1984. The Saudi Financial System, J. Wiley and Sons, Chichester.

Abdel-Magib, M.F., 1981. ‘Theory of Islamic banks: accounting implications’, International Journal of Accounting, Fall: 78-102.

Aftab, M., 1986. ‘Pakistan moves to Islamic banking’, The Banker, June: 57-60.

Ahmad, Sheikh Mahmud, l952. Economics of Islam, Lahore.

____, n.d. ‘Interest and Unemployment’, Islamic Studies, Islamabad, VIII (l): 9-46.

Al-Arabi, Mohammad Abdullah, l966. ‘Contemporary banking transactions and Islam’s views thereon’, Islamic Review, London, May l966: l0-l6.

Al-Jarhi, Ma’bid Ali, l983. ‘A monetary and financial tructure for an interest- free economy, institutions, mechanism and policy’, in Ziauddin, Ahmad et al. (eds.), Money and Banking in Islam, International Centre for Research in Islamic Economics, Jeddah, and Institute of Policy Studies, Islamabad.

Ali, M. (ed.) l982. Islamic Banks and Strategies of Economic Cooperation, New Century Publishers, London.

____ (ed.) 1984. Papers on Islamic Banking, New Century Publishers, London.

Ariff, M. l982. ‘Monetary policy in an interest-free Islamic economy – nature and scope’ in M. Ariff, (ed.), Monetary and Fiscal Economics of Islam, International Centre for Research in Islamic Economics, Jeddah.

____ 1988. Islamic Banking in South-east Asia, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore.

Bruce, N.C., 1986. ‘Islamic banking moves east’, Euromoney, July: 142-5.

Chapra, M. Umer, l982. ‘Money and banking in an Islamic economy’ in M Ariff (ed.), above.

____ l985. Toward a Just Monetary System, The Islamic Foundation, Leicester.

Choudhury, Masul Alam, l986. Contributions to Islamic Economic Theory: A Study in Social Economics, St Martin Press, New York.

Council of Islamic Ideology (CII), Pakistan, l983. ‘Elimination of interest from the economy’, in Ziauddin, Ahmed et al. (eds.).

El-Asker, A.A.F., 1987. The Islamic Business Enterprise, Croom Helm, London.

El-Din, A.K., 1986. ‘Ten years of Islamic banking’, Journal of Islamic Banking and Finance, July-September, 3(3):49-66.

Halim, Abdul, l986. ‘Sources and uses of funds: a study of Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad,’ paper presented to the Seminar on Developing a System of Islamic Financial Instruments, organized by the Ministry of Finance Malaysia and the Islamic Development Bank, Kuala Lumpur.

Hjarpe, Jan, l986. ‘Mudaraba banking and taka-ful insurance: the question of “Islamic Banks”, their significance and possible impact’, in Jan Selmer, and Loong Hoe Tan, Economic Relations between Scandinavia and ASEAN: Issues on Trade, Investment, Technology Transfer and Business Culture, University of Stockholm and Institute of South-east Asian Studies, Singapore.

Homoud, S.H., 1985. Islamic Banking, Arabian Information, London. Huq, Azizul, l986. ‘Utilization of financial investments: a case study of Bangladesh’, paper submitted to the Seminar on Developing a System of Islamic Financial Instruments, organized by the Ministry of Finance Malaysia and the Islamic Development Bank, Kuala Lumpur.

Iqbal, Zubair and Mirakhor, Abbas, l987. Islamic Banking, International Monetary Fund Occasional Paper 49, Washington D.C.

Irshad, S.A., l964. Interest-Free Banking, Orient Press of Pakistan, Karachi.

Kahf, Monzer, l982a. ‘Saving and investment functions in a two-sector Islamic economy’, in M. Ariff (ed.) , above.

____ l982b. ‘Fiscal and monetary policies in an Islamic economy’, in M. Ariff (ed.),above.

Karsten, I., 1982. ‘Islam and financial intermediation’, IMF Staff Papers, March, 29(1):108-42.

Khan, Abdul Jabbar, l986. ‘Non-interest banking in Pakistan: a case study’, paper presented to the Seminar on Developing a System of Islamic Financial Instruments, organized by the Ministry of Finance Malaysia and the Islamic Development Bank, Kuala Lumpur.

Khan, M. Fahim, l983. ‘Islamic banking as practised now in the world’ in Ziauddin, Ahmad et al. (eds.).

Khan, M. S.,1986.’Islamic interest-free banking’, I M F Staff Papers, March, 33(1):1-27.

____, 1987 ‘Principles of monetary policy in an Islamic framework’, paper presented to the International Institute of Islamic Economics, Islamabad, Pakistan, July.

A logo of Bank Islam Malaysia is seen at the bank`s headquarters in Kuala Lumpur

Research Report on Islamic Banking – Part 3

by Mohamed Ariff, University of Malaya, taken from Asian-Pacific Economic Literature, Vol. 2, No. 2 (September 1988), pp. 46-62

Literature: Practice

Recent years have brought an increasing flow of empirical studies of Islamic banking. The earliest systematic empirical work was undertaken by Khan (1983). His observations covered Islamic banks operating in Sudan, United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Bahrain, Jordan, and Egypt. Khan’s study showed that these banks had little difficulty in devising practices in conformity with Shariah. He identified two types of investment accounts: one where the depositor authorized the banks to invest the money in any project and the other where the depositor had a say in the choice of project to be financed. On the asset side, the banks under investigation had been resorting to mudaraba, musharaka and murabaha modes. Khan’s study reported profit rates ranging from 9 to 20 per cent which were competitive with conventional banks in the corresponding areas. The rates of return to depositors varied between 8 and l5 per cent, which were quite comparable with the rates of return offered by conventional banks.

Khan’s study revealed that Islamic banks had a preference for trade finance and real estate investments. The study also revealed a strong preference for quick returns, which is understandable in view of the fact that these newly established institutions were anxious to report positive results even in the early years of operation. Nienhaus (1988) suggests that the relative profitability of Islamic banks, especially in the Middle East in recent years, was to a large extent due to the property (real estate) boom. He has cited cases of heavy losses which came with the crash of the property sector.

The IMF study referred to earlier by Iqbal and Mirakhor (l987) also contains extremely interesting empirical observations, although these are confined to the experience of Iran and Pakistan, both of which have attempted to islamize the entire banking system on a comprehensive basis. Iran switched to Islamic banking in August l983 with a three-year transition period. The Iranian system allows banks to accept current and savings deposits without having to pay any return, but it permits the banks to offer incentives such as variable prizes or bonuses in cash or kind on these deposits. Term deposits (both short-term and long-term) earn a rate of return based on the bank’s profits and on the deposit maturity. No empirical evidence is as yet available on the interesting question as to whether interest or a profit-share provides the more effective incentive to depositors for the mobilization of private saving. Where Islamic and conventional banks exist side by side, central bank control of bank interest rates is liable to be circumvented by shifts of funds to the Islamic banks.

Iqbal and Mirakhor have noted that the conversion to Islamic modes has been much slower on the asset than on the deposit side. It appears that the Islamic banking system in Iran was able to use less than half of its resources for credit to the private sector, mostly in the form of short-term facilities, i.e., commercial and trade transactions. The slower pace of conversion on the asset side was attributed by the authors to the inadequate supply of personnel trained in long-term financing. The authors, however, found no evidence to show that the effectiveness of monetary policy in Iran, broadly speaking, was altered by the conversion.

The Pakistani experience differs from the Iranian one in that Pakistan had opted for a gradual islamization process which began in l979. In the first phase, which ended on l January l985, domestic banks operated both interest- free and interest-based ‘windows’. In the second phase of the transformation process, the banking system was geared to operate all transactions on the basis of no interest, the only exceptions being foreign currency deposits, foreign loans and government debts. The Pakistani model took care to ensure that the new modes of financing did not upset the basic functioning and structure of the banking system. This and the gradual pace of transition, according to the authors, made it easier for the Pakistani banks to adapt to the new system. The rate of return on profit-and-loss sharing (PLS) deposits appears not only to have been in general higher than the interest rate before islamization but also to have varied between banks, the differential indicating the degree of competition in the banking industry. The authors noted that the PLS system and the new modes of financing had accorded considerable flexibility to banks and their clients. Once again the study concluded that the effectiveness of monetary policy in Pakistan was not impaired by the changeover.

The IMF study, however, expressed considerable uneasiness about the concentration of bank assets on short-term trade credits rather than on long-term financing. This the authors found undesirable, not only because it is inconsistent with the intentions of the new system, but also because the heavy concentration on a few assets might increase risks and destabilize the asset portfolios. The study also drew attention to the difficulty experienced in both Iran and Pakistan in financing budget deficits under a non-interest system and underscored the urgent need to devise suitable interest-free instruments. Iran has, however, decreed that government borrowing on the basis of a fixed rate of return from the nationalized banking system would not amount to interest and would hence be permissible. The official rationalization is that, since all banks are nationalized, interest rates and payments among banks will cancel out in the consolidated accounts. (This, of course, abstracts from the banks’ business with non-bank customers.)

There are also some small case studies of Islamic banks operating in Bangladesh (Huq l986), Egypt (Mohammad l986), Malaysia (Halim l988b), Pakistan (Khan l986), and Sudan (Salama l988b). These studies reveal interesting similarities and differences. The current accounts in all cases are operated on the principles of al-wadiah. Savings deposits, too, are accepted on the basis of al-wadiah, but ‘gifts’ to depositors are given entirely at the discretion of the Islamic banks on the minimum balance, so that the depositors also share in profits. Investment deposits are invariably based on the mudaraba principle, but there are considerable variations. Thus, for example, the Islamic Bank of Bangladesh has been offering PLS Deposit Accounts, PLS Special Notice Deposit Accounts, and PLS Term Deposit Accounts, while Bank Islam Malaysia has been operating two kinds of investment deposits, one for the general public and the other for institutional clients.

The studies also show that the profit-sharing ratios and the modes of payment vary from place to place and from time to time. Thus, for example, profits are provisionally declared on a monthly basis in Malaysia, on a quarterly basis in Egypt, on a half-yearly basis in Bangladesh and Pakistan, and on an annual basis in Sudan.

A striking common feature of all these banks is that even their investment deposits are mostly short-term, reflecting the depositors’ preference for assets in as liquid a form as possible. Even in Malaysia, where investment deposits have accounted for a much larger proportion of the total, the bulk of them were made for a period of less than two years. By contrast, in Sudan most of the deposits have consisted of current and savings deposits, apparently because of the ceiling imposed by the Sudanese monetary authorities on investment deposits which in turn was influenced by limited investment opportunities in the domestic economy. There are also interesting variations in the pattern of resource utilization by the Islamic banks. For example, musharaka has been far more important than murabaha as an investment mode in Sudan, while the reverse has been the case in Malaysia. On the average, however, murabaha, bai’muajjal and ijara, rather than musharaka represent the most commonly used modes of financing. The case studies also show that the structure of the clientele has been skewed in favor of the more affluent segment of society, no doubt because the banks are located mainly in metropolitan centres with small branch networks.

The two main problems identified by the case studies are the absence of suitable non-interest-based financial instruments for money and capital market transactions and the high rate of borrower delinquency. The former problem has been partially redressed by Islamic banks resorting to mutual inter-bank arrangements and central bank cooperation, as mentioned earlier. The Bank Islam Malaysia, for instance, has been placing its excess liquidity with the central bank which usually exercises its discretionary powers to give some returns. The delinquency problem appears to be real and serious. Murabaha payments have often been held up because late payments cannot be penalized, in contrast to the interest system in which delayed payments would automatically mean increased interest payments. To overcome this problem, the Pakistani banks have resorted to what is called ‘mark-down’ which is the opposite of ‘mark-up’ (i.e., the profit margin in the cost-plus approach of murabaha transactions). ‘Mark-down’ amounts to giving rebates as an incentive for early payments. But the legitimacy of this ‘mark-down’ practice is questionable on Shariah grounds, since it is time- based and therefore smacks of interest.

Finally, in the most recent contribution to the growing Islamic banking literature, Nien-haus (l988) concludes that Islamic banking is viable at the microeconomic level but dismisses the proponents’ ideological claims for superiority of Islamic banking as ‘unfounded’. Nienhaus points out that there are some failure stories. Examples cited include the Kuwait Finance House which had its fingers burned by investing heavily in the Kuwaiti real estate and construction sector in l984, and the Islamic Bank International of Denmark which suffered heavy losses in l985 and l986 to the tune of more than 30 per cent of its paid-up capital. But then, as Nienhaus himself has noted, the quoted troubles of individual banks had specific causes and it would be inappropriate to draw general conclusions from particular cases. Nienhaus notes that the high growth rates of the initial years have been falling off, but he rejects the thesis that the Islamic banks have reached their ‘limits of growth’ after filling a market gap. The falling growth rates might well be due to the bigger base values, and the growth performance of Islamic banks has been relatively better in most cases than that of conventional banks in recent years.

According to Nienhaus, the market shares of many Islamic banks have increased over time, notwithstanding the deceleration in the growth of deposits. The only exception was the Faisal Islamic Bank of Sudan (FIBS) whose market share had shrunk from l5 per cent in l982 to 7 per cent in l986, but Nien-haus claims that the market shares lost by FIBS were won not by conventional banks but by newer Islamic banks in Sudan. Short-term trade financing has clearly been dominant in most Islamic banks regardless of size. This is contrary to the expectation that the Islamic banks would be active mainly in the field of corporate financing on a participation basis. Nien-haus attributes this not only to insufficient supply by the banks but also to weak demand by entrepreneurs who may prefer fixed interest cost to sharing their profits with the banks.

Conclusion

The preceding discussion makes it clear that Islamic banking is not a negligible or merely temporary phenomenon. Islamic banks are here to stay and there are signs that they will continue to grow and expand. Even if one does not subscribe to the Islamic injunction against the institution of interest, one may find in Islamic banking some innovative ideas which could add more variety to the existing financial network.

One of the main selling points of Islamic banking, at least in theory, is that, unlike conventional banking, it is concerned about the viability of the project and the profitability of the operation but not the size of the collateral. Good projects which might be turned down by conventional banks for lack of collateral would be financed by Islamic banks on a profit-sharing basis. It is especially in this sense that Islamic banks can play a catalytic role in stimulating economic development. In many developing countries, of course, development banks are supposed to perform this function. Islamic banks are expected to be more enterprising than their conventional counterparts. In practice, however, Islamic banks have been concentrating on short-term trade finance which is the least risky.

Part of the explanation is that long-term financing requires expertise which is not always available. Another reason is that there are no back-up institutional structures such as secondary capital markets for Islamic financial instruments. It is possible also that the tendency to concentrate on short-term financing reflects the early years of operation: it is easier to administer, less risky, and the returns are quicker. The banks may learn to pay more attention to equity financing as they grow older.

It is sometimes suggested that Islamic banks are rather complacent. They tend to behave as though they had a captive market in the Muslim masses who will come to them on religious grounds. This complacency seems more pronounced in countries with only one Islamic bank. Many Muslims find it more convenient to deal with conventional banks and have no qualms about shifting their deposits between Islamic banks and conventional ones depending on which bank offers a better return. This might suggest a case for more Islamic banks in those countries as it would force the banks to be more innovative and competitive. Another solution would be to allow the conventional banks to undertake equity financing and/or to operate Islamic ‘counters’ or ‘windows’, subject to strict compliance with the Shariah rules. It is perhaps not too wild a proposition to suggest that there is a need for specialized Islamic financial institutions such as mudaraba banks, murabaha banks and musharaka banks which would compete with one another to provide the best possible services.

"Banking Without Interest" by Muhammad Siddiqi

Research Report on Islamic Banking – Part 2

by Mohamed Ariff, University of Malaya, taken from Asian-Pacific Economic Literature, Vol. 2, No. 2 (September 1988), pp. 46-62

Anatomy

As mentioned earlier, Islam does not deny that capital, as a factor of production, deserves to be rewarded. Islam allows the owners of capital a share in a surplus which is uncertain. To put it differently, investors in the Islamic order have no right to demand a fixed rate of return. No one is entitled to any addition to the principal sum if he does not share in the risks involved. The owner of capital (rabbul-mal) may ‘invest’ by allowing an entrepreneur with ideas and expertise to use the capital for productive purposes and he may share the profits, if any, with the entrepreneur- borrower (mudarib); losses, if any, however, will be borne wholly by the rabbul-mal. This mode of financing, termed mudaraba in the Islamic literature, was in practice even in the pre-Qur’anic days and, according to jurists, it was approved by the Prophet.

Another legitimate mode of financing recognized in Islam is one based on equity participation (musharaka) in which the partners use their capital jointly to generate a surplus. Profits or losses will be shared between the partners according to some agreed formula depending on the equity ratio.

Mudaraba and musharaka constitute, at least in principle if not in practice, the twin pillars of Islamic banking. The musharaka principle is invoked in the equity structure of Islamic banks and is similar to the modern concepts of partnership and joint stock ownership. In so far as the depositors are concerned, an Islamic bank acts as a mudarib which manages the funds of the depositors to generate profits subject to the rules of mudaraba as outlined above. The bank may in turn use the depositors’ funds on a mudaraba basis in addition to other lawful modes of financing. In other words, the bank operates a two-tier mudaraba system in which it acts both as the mudarib on the saving side of the equation and as the rabbul-mal on the investment portfolio side. The bank may also enter into musharaka contracts with the users of the funds, sharing profits and losses, as mentioned above. At the deposit end of the scale, Islamic banks normally operate three broad categories of account, mainly current, savings, and investment accounts. The current account, as in the case of conventional banks, gives no return to the depositors. It is essentially a safe-keeping (al-wadiah) arrangement between the depositors and the bank, which allows the depositors to withdraw their money at any time and permits the bank to use the depositors’ money. As in the case of conventional banks, cheque books are issued to the current account deposit holders and the Islamic banks provide the broad range of payment facilities – clearing mechanisms, bank drafts, bills of exchange, travellers cheques, etc. (but not yet, it seems, credit cards or bank cards). More often than not, no service charges are made by the banks in this regard.

The savings account is also operated on an al-wadiah basis, but the bank may at its absolute discretion pay the depositors a positive return periodically, depending on its own profitability. Such payment is considered lawful in Islam since it is not a condition for lending by the depositors to the bank, nor is it pre-determined. The savings account holders are issued with savings books and are allowed to withdraw their money as and when they please. The investment account is based on the mudaraba principle, and the deposits are term deposits which cannot be withdrawn before maturity. The profit- sharing ratio varies from bank to bank and from time to time depending on supply and demand conditions.4 In theory, the rate of return could be positive or negative, but in practice the returns have always been positive and quite comparable to rates conventional banks offer on their term deposits.5

At the investment portfolio end of the scale, Islamic banks employ a variety of instruments. The mudaraba and musharaka modes, referred to earlier, are supposedly the main conduits for the outflow of funds from the banks. In practice, however, Islamic banks have shown a strong preference for other modes which are less risky. The most commonly used mode of financing seems to be the ‘mark-up’ device which is termed murabaha. In a murabaha transaction, the bank finances the purchase of a good or asset by buying it on behalf of its client and adding a mark-up before re-selling it to the client on a ‘cost-plus’ basis. It may appear at first glance that the mark-up is just another term for interest as charged by conventional banks, interest thus being admitted through the back door. What makes the murabaha transaction Islamically legitimate is that the bank first acquires the asset and in the process it assumes certain risks between purchase and resale. The bank takes responsibility for the good before it is safely delivered to the client. The services rendered by the Islamic bank are therefore regarded as quite different from those of a conventional bank which simply lends money to the client to buy the good.

Islamic banks have also been resorting to purchase and resale of properties on a deferred payment basis, which is termed bai’ muajjal. It is considered lawful in fiqh (jurisprudence) to charge a higher price for a good if payments are to be made at a later date. According to fiqh, this does not amount to charging interest, since it is not a lending transaction but a trading one.

Leasing or ijara is also frequently practised by Islamic banks. Under this mode, the banks would buy the equipment or machinery and lease it out to their clients who may opt to buy the items eventually, in which case the monthly payments will consist of two components, i.e., rental for the use of the equipment and instalment towards the purchase price.

Reference must also be made to pre-paid purchase of goods, which is termed bai’salam, as a means used by Islamic banks to finance production. Here the price is paid at the time of the contract but the delivery would take place at a future date. This mode enables an entrepreneur to sell his output to the bank at a price determined in advance. Islamic banks, in keeping with modern times, have extended this facility to manufactures as well.

It is clear from the above sketch that Islamic banking goes beyond the pure financing activities of conventional banks. Islamic banks engage in equity financing and trade financing. By its very nature, Islamic banking is a risky business compared with conventional banking, for risk-sharing forms the very basis of all Islamic financial transactions. To minimize risks, however, Islamic banks have taken pains to distribute the eggs over many baskets and have established reserve funds out of past profits which they can fall back on in the event of any major loss.

Literature: Theory

It is not possible to cover in this survey all the publications which have appeared on Islamic banking. There are numerous publications in Arabic and Urdu which have made significant contributions to the theoretical discussion. A brief description of these in English can be found in the Appendix to Siddiqi’s book on Banking without Interest (Siddiqi l983a). The early contributions on the subject of Islamic banking were somewhat casual in the sense that only passing references were made to it in the discussion of wider issues relating to the Islamic economic system as a whole. In other words, the early writers had been simply thinking aloud rather than presenting well-thought-out ideas. Thus, for example, the book by Qureshi on Islam and the Theory of Interest (Qureshi l946) looked upon banking as a social service that should be sponsored by the government like public health and education. Qureshi took this point of view since the bank could neither pay any interest to account holders nor charge any interest on loans advanced. Qureshi also spoke of partnerships between banks and businessmen as a possible alternative, sharing losses if any. No mention was made of profit-sharing.

Ahmad, in Chapter VII of his book Economics of Islam (Ahmad l952), envisaged the establishment of Islamic banks on the basis of a joint stock company with limited liability. In his scheme, in addition to current accounts, on which no dividend or interest should be paid, there was an account in which people could deposit their capital on the basis of partnership, with shareholders receiving higher dividends than the account holders from the profits made. Like Qureshi, above, Ahmad also spoke of possible partnership arrangements with the businessmen who seek capital from the banks. However, the partnership principle was left undefined, nor was it clear who would bear the loss if any. It was suggested that banks should cash bills of trade without charging interest, using the current account funds.

The principle of mudaraba based on Shariah was invoked systematically by Uzair (l955). His principal contribution lay in suggesting mudaraba as the main premise for ‘interestless banking’. However, his argument that the bank should not make any capital investment with its own deposits rendered his analysis somewhat impractical.

Al-Arabi (l966) envisaged a banking system with mudaraba as the main pivot. He was actually advancing the idea of a two-tier mudaraba which would enable the bank to mobilize savings on a mudaraba basis, allocating the funds so mobilized also on a mudaraba basis. In other words the bank would act as a mudarib in so far as the depositors were concerned, while the ‘borrowers’ would act as mudaribs in so far as the bank was concerned. In his scheme, the bank could advance not only the capital procured through deposits but also the capital of its own shareholders. It is also of interest to note that his position with regard to the distribution of profits and the responsibility for losses was strictly in accordance with the Shariah.6 Irshad (l964) also spoke of mudaraba as the basis of Islamic banking, but his concept of mudaraba was quite different from the traditional one in that he thought of capital and labour (including entrepreneurship) as having equal shares in output, thus sharing the losses and profits equally. This actually means that the owner of capital and the entrepreneur have a fifty-fifty share in the profit or loss as the case may be, which runs counter to the Shariah position. Irshad envisaged two kinds of deposit accounts. The first sounded like current deposits in the sense that it would be payable on demand, but the money kept in this deposit would be used for social welfare projects, as the depositors would get zero return. The second one amounted to term deposits which would entitle the depositors to a share in the profits at the end of the year proportionately to the size and duration of the deposits. He recommended the setting up of a Reserve Fund which would absorb all losses so that no depositor would have to bear any loss. According to Irshad, all losses would be either recovered from the Reserve Fund or borne by the shareholders of the bank.

A pioneering attempt at providing a fairly detailed outline of Islamic banking was made in Urdu by Siddiqi in l968. (The English version was not published until l983.) His Islamic banking model was based on mudaraba and shirka (partnership or musharaka as it is now usually called). His model was essentially one based on a two-tier mudaraba financier-entrepreneur relationship, but he took pains to describe the mechanics of such transactions in considerable detail with numerous hypothetical and arithmetic examples. He classified the operations of an Islamic bank into three categories: services based on fees, commissions or other fixed charges; financing on the basis of mudaraba and partnership; and services provided free of charge. His thesis was that such interest-free banks could be a viable alternative to interest-based conventional banks.

The issue of loans for consumption clearly presents a problem, as there is no profit to be shared. Siddiqi addressed this problem, but he managed only to scratch the surface. While recognizing the need for such interest-free loans (qard hasan), especially for meeting basic needs, he seemed to think it was the duty of the community and the State (through its baitul mal or treasury) to cater to those needs; the Islamic bank’s primary objective, like that of any other business unit, is to earn profit. He therefore tended to downplay the role of Islamic banks in providing consumption loans, but he suggested limited overdraft facilities without interest. He even considered a portion of the fund being set aside for consumption loans, repayment being guaranteed by the State. He also suggested that consumers buying durables on credit would issue ‘certificates of sale’ which could be encashed by the seller at the bank for a fee. It was then the seller not the buyer who would be liable as far as the bank was concerned. However, the principles of murabaha and bai’ muajjal were not invoked.

Strangely, Siddiqi favoured keeping the number of shareholders to the minimum, without advancing any strong reasons. This is contrary to the general consensus which now seems to have emerged with reference to Islamic banks operating on a joint stock company basis, a consensus which incidentally is also in line with the Islamic value attached to a broad equity base as against heavy concentration of equity and wealth. Ironically, Siddiqi thought that interest-free banking could operate successfully ‘only in a country where interest is legally prohibited and any transaction based upon interest is declared a punishable offense’ (l983b:l3). He also thought it important to have Islamic laws enforced before interest-free banking could operate well. This view has not gained acceptance, as demonstrated by the many Islamic banks which operate profitably in ‘hostile’ environments, as noted earlier.

Chapra’s model of Islamic banking (Chapra l982), like Siddiqi’s, was based on the mudaraba principle. His main concern, however, centered on the role of artificial purchasing power through credit creation. He even suggested that ’seigniorage’ resulting from it should be transferred to the public exchequer, for the sake of equity and justice. Al-Jarhi (l983) went so far as to favor the imposition of a l00 per cent reserve requirement on commercial banks. Chapra was also much concerned about the concentration of economic power private banks might enjoy in a system based on equity financing. He therefore preferred medium-sized banks which are neither so large as to wield excessive power nor so small as to be uneconomical. Chapra’s scheme also contained proposals for loss-compensating reserves and loss-absorbing insurance facilities. He also spoke of non-bank financial institutions, which specialize in bringing financiers and entrepreneurs together and act as investment trusts.

Mohsin (l982) has presented a detailed and elaborate framework of Islamic banking in a modern setting. His model incorporates the characteristics of commercial, merchant, and development banks, blending them in novel fashion. It adds various non-banking services such as trust business, factoring, real estate, and consultancy, as though interest-free banks could not survive by banking business alone. Many of the activities listed certainly go beyond the realm of commercial banking and are of so sophisticated and specialized a nature that they may be thought irrelevant to most Muslim countries at their present stage of development. Mohsin’s model clearly was designed to fit into a capitalist environment; indeed he explicitly stated that riba-free banks could coexist with interest-based banks. The point that there is more to Islamic banking than mere abolition of interest was driven home strongly by Chapra (l985). He envisaged Islamic banks whose nature, outlook and operations could be distinctly different from those of conventional banks. Besides the outlawing of riba, he considered it essential that Islamic banks should, since they handle public funds, serve the public interest rather than individual or group interests. In other words, they should play a social-welfare-oriented rather than a profit-maximizing role. He conceived of Islamic banks as a cross-breed of commercial and merchant banks, investment trusts and investment-management institutions that would offer a wide spectrum of services to their customers. Unlike conventional banks which depend heavily on the ‘crutches of collateral and of non-participation in risk’ (p. l55), Islamic banks would have to rely heavily on project evaluation, especially for equity-oriented financing. Thanks to the profit-and-loss sharing nature of the operations, bank-customer relations would be much closer and more cordial than is possible under conventional banking. Finally, the problems of liquidity shortage or surplus would have to be handled differently in Islamic banking, since the ban on interest rules out resort to the money market and the central bank. Chapra suggested alternatives such as reciprocal accommodation among banks without interest payments and creation of a common fund at the central bank into which surpluses would flow and from which shortages could be met without any interest charges.

The literature also discusses the question of central banking in an Islamic framework. The general opinion seems to be that the basic functions of a modern central bank are relevant also for an Islamic monetary system, although the mechanisms may have to be different. Thus, for example, the bank rate instrument cannot be used as it entails interest. Uzair (l982) has suggested adjustments in profit-sharing ratios as a substitute for bank rate manipulations by the central bank. Thus, credit can be tightened by reducing the share accruing to the businessmen and eased by increasing it. Siddiqi (l982) has suggested that variations in the so-called ‘refinance ratio’ (which refers to the central bank refinancing of a part of the interest-free loans provided by the commercial banks) would influence the quantum of short-term credit extended. Siddiqi has also proposed a prescribed ‘lending ratio’ (i.e., the proportion of demand deposits that commercial banks are obliged to lend out as interest-free loans) that can be adjusted by the central bank according to changing circumstances. In this context, reference may also be made to a proposal by Uzair (l982) that the central bank should acquire an equity stake in commercial banking by holding, say, 25 per cent of the capital stock of the commercial banks. The rationale behind this proposal was that it would give the central bank access to a permanent source of income so that it could effectively act as lender of last resort. The discussion of central banking in an Islamic context is somewhat scanty, presumably because Islamic central banking is viewed as too far-fetched an idea, except in Iran and Pakistan.

It emerges from all this that Islamic banking has three distinguishing features: (a) it is interest-free, (b) it is multi-purpose and not purely commercial, and (c) it is strongly equity-oriented. The literature contains hardly any serious criticism of the interest-free character of the operation, since this is taken for granted, although concerns have been expressed about the lack of adequate interest-free instruments. There is a near-consensus that Islamic banks can function well without interest. A recent International Monetary Fund study by Iqbal and Mirakhor (l987) has found Islamic banking to be a viable proposition that can result in efficient resource allocation. The study suggests that banks in an Islamic system face fewer solvency and liquidity risks than their conventional counterparts. The multi-purpose and extra-commercial nature of the Islamic banking operation does not seem to pose intractable problems. The abolition of interest makes it imperative for Islamic banks to look for other instruments, which renders operations outside the periphery of commercial banking unavoidable. Such operations may yield economies of scope. But it is undeniable that the multipurpose character of Islamic banking poses serious practical problems, especially in relation to the skills needed to handle such diverse and complex transactions (Iqbal and Mirakhor l987).

The stress on equity-oriented transactions in Islamic banking, especially the mudaraba mode, has been criticized. It has been argued that the replacement of pre-determined interest by uncertain profits is not enough to render a transaction Islamic, since profit can be just as exploitative as interest is, if it is ‘excessive’ (Naqvi l98l). Naqvi has also pointed out that there is nothing sacrosanct about the institution of mudaraba in Islam. Naqvi maintains that mudaraba is not based on the Qur’an or the Hadith but was a custom of the pre-Islamic Arabs. Historically, mudaraba, he contends, enabled the aged, women, and children with capital to engage in trade through merchants for a share in the profit, all losses being borne by the owners of capital, and therefore it cannot claim any sanctity. The fact remains that the Prophet raised no objection to mudaraba, so that it was at least not considered un-Islamic.

The distribution of profit in mudaraba transactions presents practical difficulties, especially where there are multiple providers of capital, but these difficulties are not regarded as insurmountable. The Report of Pakistan’s Council of Islamic Ideology (CII l983) has suggested that the respective capital contributions of parties can be converted to a common denominator by multiplying the amounts provided with the number of days during which each component, such as the firm’s own equity capital, its current cash surplus and suppliers’ credit was actually deployed in the business, i.e., on a daily product basis. As for deposits, profits (net of administrative expenses, taxes, and appropriation for reserves) would be divided between the shareholders of the bank and the holders of deposits, again on a daily product basis.

Islamic Development Bank in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia

Research Report on Islamic Banking – Part 1

by Mohamed Ariff, University of Malaya, taken from Asian-Pacific Economic Literature, Vol. 2, No. 2 (September 1988), pp. 46-62

Islamic banking is a new phenomenon that has taken many observers by surprise. The whole banking system has been islamized in both Iran and Pakistan. In addition, there are some thirty Islamic banks in operation in other parts of the globe, including the Jeddah-based Islamic Development Bank (IDB) but excluding numerous non-bank Islamic financial institutions (see Appendix). What is more, the speed with which Islamic banks have sprung up and the rate at which they have progressed make it worth-while to study them systematically. An attempt is made in this paper (a) to survey the growing literature on Islamic banking, in particular (b) to trace the growth and development of Islamic banking, and (c) to highlight its salient characteristics.

Evolution

The first modern experiment with Islamic banking was undertaken in Egypt under cover, without projecting an Islamic image, for fear of being seen as a manifestation of Islamic fundamentalism which was anathema to the political regime. The pioneering effort, led by Ahmad El Najjar, took the form of a savings bank based on profit-sharing in the Egyptian town of Mit Ghamr in l963. This experiment lasted until l967 (Ready l98l), by which time there were nine such banks in the country. These banks, which neither charged nor paid interest, invested mostly by engaging in trade and industry, directly or in partnership with others, and shared the profits with their depositors (Siddiqi l988). Thus, they functioned essentially as saving- investment institutions rather than as commercial banks. The Nasir Social Bank, established in Egypt in l97l, was declared an interest-free commercial bank, although its charter made no reference to Islam or Shariah (Islamic law).

The IDB was established in l974 by the Organization of Islamic Countries (OIC), but it was primarily an inter-governmental bank aimed at providing funds for development projects in member countries. The IDB provides fee- based financial services and profit-sharing financial assistance to member countries. The IDB operations are free of interest and are explicitly based on Shariah Principles.

In the seventies, changes took place in the political climate of many Muslim countries so that there was no longer any strong need to establish Islamic financial institutions under cover. A number of Islamic banks, both in letter and spirit, came into existence in the Middle East, e.g., the Dubai Islamic Bank (l975), the Faisal Islamic Bank of Sudan (l977), the Faisal Islamic Bank of Egypt (l977), and the Bahrain Islamic Bank (l979), to mention a few.

The Asia-Pacific region was not oblivious to the winds of change. The Philippine Amanah Bank (PAB) was established in l973 by Presidential Decree as a specialized banking institution without reference to its Islamic character in the bank’s charter. The establishment of the PAB was a response by the Philippines Government to the Muslim rebellion in the south, designed to serve the special banking needs of the Muslim community. However, the primary task of the PAB was to assist rehabilitation and reconstruction in Mindanao, Sulu and Palawan in the south (Mastura l988). The PAB has eight branches located in the major cities of the southern Muslim provinces, including one in Makati (Metro Manila), in addition to the head office located at Zamboanga City in Mindanao. The PAB, however, is not strictly an Islamic bank, since interest-based operations continue to coexist with the Islamic modes of financing. It is indeed fascinating to observe that the PAB operates two ‘windows’ for deposit transactions, i.e., conventional and Islamic. Nevertheless, efforts are underway to convert the PAB into a full-fledged Islamic bank (Mastura l988).

Islamic banking made its debut in Malaysia in l983, but not without antecedents. The first Islamic financial institution in Malaysia was the Muslim Pilgrims Savings Corporation set up in l963 to help people save for performing hajj (pilgrimage to Mecca and Medina). In l969, this body evolved into the Pilgrims Management and Fund Board or the Tabung Haji as it is now popularly known. The Tabung Haji has been acting as a finance company that invests the savings of would-be pilgrims in accordance with Shariah, but its role is rather limited, as it is a non-bank financial institution. The success of the Tabung Haji, however, provided the main impetus for establishing Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad (BIMB) which represents a full- fledged Islamic commercial bank in Malaysia. The Tabung Haji also contributed l2.5 per cent of BIMB’s initial capital of M$80 million. BIMB has a complement of fourteen branches in several parts of the country. Plans are afoot to open six new branches a year so that by l990 the branch network of BIMB will total thirty-three (Man l988).

Reference should also be made to some Islamic financial institutions established in countries where Muslims are a minority. There was a proliferation of interest-free savings and loan societies in India during the seventies (Siddiqi l988). The Islamic Banking System (now called Islamic Finance House), established in Luxembourg in l978, represents the first attempt at Islamic banking in the Western world. There is also an Islamic Bank International of Denmark, in Copenhagen, and the Islamic Investment Company has been set up in Melbourne, Australia.

Rationale

The essential feature of Islamic banking is that it is interest-free. Although it is often claimed that there is more to Islamic banking, such as contributions towards a more equitable distribution of income and wealth, and increased equity participation in the economy (Chapra l982), it nevertheless derives its specific rationale from the fact that there is no place for the institution of interest in the Islamic order.

Islam prohibits Muslims from taking or giving interest (riba) regardless of the purpose for which such loans are made and regardless of the rates at which interest is charged. To be sure, there have been attempts to distinguish between usury and interest and between loans for consumption and for production. It has also been argued that riba refers to usury practiced by petty money-lenders and not to interest charged by modern banks and that no riba is involved when interest is imposed on productive loans, but these arguments have not won acceptance. Apart from a few dissenting opinions, he general consensus among Muslim scholars clearly is that there is no difference between riba and interest. In what follows, these two terms are used interchangeably.

The prohibition of riba is mentioned in four different revelations in the Qur’an.1 The first revelation emphasizes that interest deprives wealth of God’s blessings. The second revelation condemns it, placing interest in juxtaposition with wrongful appropriation of property belonging to others. The third revelation enjoins Muslims to stay clear of interest for the sake of their own welfare. The fourth revelation establishes a clear distinction between interest and trade, urging Muslims to take only the principal sum and to forgo even this sum if the borrower is unable to repay. It is further declared in the Qur’an that those who disregard the prohibition of interest are at war with God and His Prophet. The prohibition of interest is also cited in no uncertain terms in the Hadith (sayings of the Prophet). The Prophet condemned not only those who take interest but also those who give interest and those who record or witness the transaction, saying that they are all alike in guilt.2

It may be mentioned in passing that similar prohibitions are to be found in the pre-Qur’anic scriptures, although the ‘People of the Book’, as the Qur’an refers to them, had chosen to rationalize them. It is amazing that Islam has successfully warded off various subsequent rationalization attempts aimed at legitimizing the institution of interest.

Some scholars have put forward economic reasons to explain why interest is banned in Islam. It has been argued, for instance, that interest, being a pre-determined cost of production, tends to prevent full employment (Khan l968; Ahmad n.d.; Mannan l970). In the same vein, it has been contended that international monetary crises are largely due to the institution of interest (Khan, n.d), and that trade cycles are in no small measure attributable to the phenomenon of interest (Ahmad l952; Su’ud n.d.). None of these studies, however, has really succeeded in establishing a causal link between interest, on the one hand, and employment and trade cycles, on the other. Others, anxious to vindicate the Islamic position on interest, have argued that interest is not very effective as a monetary policy instrument even in capitalist economies and have questioned the efficacy of the rate of interest as a determinant of saving and investment (Ariff l982). A common thread running through all these discussions is the exploitative character of the institution of interest, although some have pointed out that profit (which is lawful in Islam) can also be exploitative. One response to this is that one must distinguish between profit and profiteering, and Islam has prohibited the latter as well.

Some writings have alluded to the ‘unearned income’ aspect of interest payments as a possible explanation for the Islamic doctrine. The objection that rent on property is considered halal (lawful) is then answered by rejecting the analogy between rent on property and interest on loans, since the benefit to the tenant is certain, while the productivity of the borrowed capital is uncertain. Besides, property rented out is subject to physical wear and tear, while money lent out is not. The question of erosion in the value of money and hence the need for indexation is an interesting one. But the Islamic jurists have ruled out compensation for erosion in the value of money, or, according to Hadith, a fungible good must be returned by its like (mithl): ‘gold for gold, silver for silver, wheat for wheat, barley for barley, dates for dates, salt for salt, like for like, equal for equal, and hand to hand …’.3

The bottom line is that Muslims need no ‘proofs’ before they reject the institution of interest: no human explanation for a divine injunction is necessary for them to accept a dictum, as they recognize the limits to human reasoning. No human mind can fathom a divine order; therefore it is a matter of faith (iman).

The Islamic ban on interest does not mean that capital is costless in an Islamic system. Islam recognizes capital as a factor of production but it does not allow the factor to make a prior or pre-determined claim on the productive surplus in the form of interest. This obviously poses the question as to what will then replace the interest rate mechanism in an Islamic framework. There have been suggestions that profit-sharing can be a viable alternative (Kahf l982a and l982b). In Islam, the owner of capital can legitimately share the profits made by the entrepreneur. What makes profit- sharing permissible in Islam, while interest is not, is that in the case of the former it is only the profit-sharing ratio, not the rate of return itself that is predetermined.

It has been argued that profit-sharing can help allocate resources efficiently, as the profit-sharing ratio can be influenced by market forces so that capital will flow into those sectors which offer the highest profit- sharing ratio to the investor, other things being equal. One dissenting view is that the substitution of profit-sharing for interest as a resource allocating mechanism is crude and imperfect and that the institution of interest should therefore be retained as a necessary evil (Naqvi l982). However, mainstream Islamic thinking on this subject clearly points to the need to replace interest with something else, although there is no clear consensus on what form the alternative to the interest rate mechanism should take. The issue is not resolved and the search for an alternative continues, but it has not detracted from efforts to experiment with Islamic banking without interest.

1. Research Report on Islamic Banking, Part 1
2. Research Report on Islamic Banking, Part 2
3. Research Report on Islamic Banking, Part 3
4. Research Report on Islamic Banking, Part 4 – Glossary, Appendix and References

KUALA LUMPUR – THE global economic crisis has handed the Islamic finance sector a ‘golden opportunity’ to show it is a better alternative to capitalism, Malaysia said on Monday.

Although capitalism has been pre-eminent for centuries, ‘it is becoming obvious that there is now more proof of its weaknesses,’ Deputy Prime Minister Najib Razak said in a speech to an Islamic economic conference.

‘We Muslims should see the current situation as a golden opportunity for us to prove the power, strength and effectiveness of the Islamic banking and finance system,’ he said in an opening address.

Islamic banking, a booming US$1 trillion (S$1.49 trillion) global industry that prohibits speculation and high levels of debt, has been relatively unscathed by the credit crunch.

The rules of the sector – which incorporate principles of sharia or Islamic law – prohibit many of the risky activities that triggered the crisis that is felling economies around the world.

‘An economic system that is not closely linked to real and productive activities is a threat to the entire system,’ said Mr Najib, who is also finance minister.

He said the Islamic approach could provide ‘concrete and realistic’ measures to tackle the crisis and that Malaysia, Southeast Asia’s leader in the field, was committed to developing the sector with better training and marketing.

Islamic law prohibits the payment and collection of interest, which is seen as a form of gambling, so highly complex instruments such as derivatives and other creative accounting practices are banned.

Transactions must be backed by real assets – not repackaged subprime, or high-risk, mortgages – and because risk is shared between the bank and the depositor there is an incentive for the institutions to ensure the deal is sound.

Islamic finance also shuns investments in gambling, alcohol and pornography in favour of ethical investments. — AFP

KARACHI: Governor State Bank of Pakistan Dr. Shamshad Akhtar has said that Islamic Banking industry is showing promising signs of sustainable growth. She expressed these views while briefing the media while inaugurating Meezan Bank’s 100th branch here on Thursday.

She said that the beauty of Islamic finance system is that if it is adapted in letter and spirit it is the most transparent and ethical system of finance. She said that Islamic finance system has a great potential to meet the financial requirements of society at large and would continue to grow its market share exponentially in the years to come in Pakistan…

Speaking on the occasion Mr. Irfan Siddiqui, President and CEO of Meezan Bank said that Meezan Bank, the first and largest Islamic Bank in Pakistan is committed to fulfilling its vision of establishing Islamic Banking as banking of first choice. He said that Meezan Bank is now present in 31 cities of Pakistan and branch expansion will continue during 2008 making the Bank one of the fastest growing Banks in the history of Pakistan…

The article offers additional specifics about the growth of Islamic banking in Pakistan. What really caught my eye in Dr. Shamshad Akhtar’s comment that the Islamic banking system ” is the most transparent and ethical system of finance.”

That’s absolutely true and it’s a fact that is often overlooked in discussions about Islamic finance. Islamic finance (revolving around the prohibition of ribaa but not confined to that) is not just a quirk of Islamic law. It’s not just a modern innovation designed to allow Muslims to follow the Shari’ah. It’s not just a “new alternative.”

Islamic finance is, at its heart, the most productive, honest and ethical system of finance for humanity. That’s the whole point. It is a system of finance that does not exploit the poor, or take advantage of anyone. It allows investors to profit in a free market system without oppressing anyone.

So am I saying that the interest-based system that dominates world markets is oppressive? Of course it is! Just look at what is happening today with the sub-prime mortgage crisis in the United States. Millions of people are losing their homes. Look at the huge burden of debt carried by many third-world countries, who spend as much as 30% of 40% of their GNP to simply pay the interest on massive loans. The interest-based system is inherently oppressive.

All Islamic laws and systems have been designed for the benefit of humanity as a whole, and this includes the Islamic finance system. It’s good to remember this fact in any discussion of Islamic finance. It’s great to hear that it is growing worldwide and even becoming the dominant system of finance in some countries.

MANAMA: Islamic banks face specific categories of financial risks compared to conventional banks, says an industry report.

According to research by Moody’s Investors Services the most critical risks are entanglement and displaced commercial risks.

“The first one reflects the fact that each Sharia-compliant transaction tends to include credit, market and operational risks, all of which we need to understand to better fine-tune our analysis,” the report by the financial research and analysis group said.

“Islamic banks are improving the way they identify, measure, control and mitigate those risks, as balance-sheet and capital management is becoming a critical field where investments in technology and human talent are increasing”

“Beyond financial risks, Islamic banks are also subject to other forms of risks, specific to their business models.”

It argues these are reputation risks and the risks of being perceived as not sufficiently Sharia-compliant.

“This has a powerful disciplinary effect, but could become harmful should the market perceive any form of incompliance,” it adds.

The report identifies five possible weaknesses in these institutions.

These include the range of asset classes found in Islamic banks and the relatively weak position of investment account holders.

“The importance of the Sharia supervisory board and the bank’s ability to provide the board with adequate information as well as abide by its rulings, is also an issue as is rate-of-return risk and new operational risks.

“Notwithstanding that the Islamic Financial Services Board’s endeavour to provide the Islamic banking industry with a set of guidelines towards best-practice risk management, we believe that a number of additional risk issues deserve further examination,” the report adds.

“This view stems from Islamic financial institution’s relatively short track record – modern Islamic banking has been in existence for only three decades and many sukuk products are less than a decade old – and the fact that most Islamic banks are active in the developing world where transparency, corporate governance and risk management at large are still works in progress.

“The other problem it identifies is the shortage of skilled risk management professionals familiar enough with the Sharia-compliant banking universe.”

Muslim scholars say the Qur’an prohibits collecting interest on loans. But many banks, both global and local, have found clever ways to meet religious strictures. It’s a system that may be hypocritical, but also profitable.

The coverage can be a little bit breathless: “La finance Islamique en plein boom,” Le Figaro reported in September. Yes, Islamic banking, structured along the lines that religion decrees, is in full boom. But is it really banking? And is it really kosher?

Islam prohibits the payment of interest on loans, so observant Muslims require specialized alternative arrangements from their banks. Many of the largest global financial companies, including Deutsche Bank and JPMorgan Chase, have established thriving subsidiaries that strive to meet these requirements. As a result, optimists speculate that the common pursuit of lucre—divinely sanctioned, filthy, or otherwise—will bring bickering civilizations together. They may be right.

The Islamic aversion to interest collection comes from the Qur’an. Not that the term “interest” is ever used: the Arabic injunction forbids something called riba. The Qur’an offers no exact definition of what riba meant in seventh-century Arabia, the time and place of the Prophet Mohammed—let alone what the term should mean today. In particular, the passages are ambiguous on the question of whether riba refers to all kinds of interest collection, or only usurious interest—that is, lending practices that are, according to some ill-defined standard, unfair and exploitative. What is clear in the divine financial critique is that, whatever riba may be, Jews are doing it. At one point God warns that they will face a “painful day of doom” if they keep it up.

This ambiguity was a practical problem for the early Muslim jurists, who formalized religious rules in a code called sharia. They were divided on the subject, but as time went on, the weight of consensus came to rest on the side of prohibiting all interest collection.

The financial instruments that 20th-century Islamic theorists championed were updated versions of medieval commercial instruments, still known in the Islamic financial sector by their Arabic names: in addition to bonds, known as sukuk, there are profit-and-loss sharing instruments known as musharaka or mudaraba, Islamic leases known as ijara, and a commercial trade instrument called murabaha, the flexibility of which has made it extremely popular among Islamic financial firms.

Banking, as an institution, evolved at the same time as the unprecedented economic growth in Europe over the past 500 years. That growth was made possible in part by the codification, in the 12th century, of a distinction between usury and interest in the Christian tradition.

The Islamic world witnessed the development of corporate contract law and the European banking system from afar. A mixture of traditional arrangements and, later, imported Western practices prevailed in Muslim countries. But it wasn’t until the 1960s that anyone tried to combine the two, governing a modern bank according to Islamic law.

Islamic financial institutions, the argument went, would boost the economic development of Muslim societies. The fraternal style of Islamic banking—with its emphasis on equity financing rather than lending—would enhance social responsibility. In practice, however, Islamic finance has had to bend to the same pressures as any other kind of finance. Social, religiously oriented investment in the development of the Islamic world is something people are more interested in publicly championing than personally doing. Khalid Ikram, who represented the World Bank in Egypt, says of Islamic banking, “it hasn’t had a lot to do with development.”

Pinning down the growth of Islamic banking is a challenge. Whether a banking system truly counts as halal—that is, compliant with the laws of sharia, or, in another religious context, kosher—is a religious question, hard for accountants to answer. Take Iran: should the country’s whole banking system, which is nominally Islamic, be counted as part of the sector even though many experts raise questions about its legitimacy?

The numbers I found were anecdotal. Rodney Wilson, professor of economics at Durham University in Britain and editor of the essay collection The Politics of Islamic Finance, estimates total assets within halal banking systems at just under $500 billion. That’s roughly the size of Wells Fargo Bank, America’s fourth-largest. Hussein A. Hassan of Deutsche Bank predicts that Islamic finance will be the world’s fastest-growing banking sector for years, based on what he calls a modest estimate of 20 percent annual increases in deposits.

So it’s big business, getting bigger, and those who hesitate to enter it now risk suffering an expertise deficit later. The number of professionals trained to structure sharia-compliant products, and of religious scholars qualified to certify them, is small enough to be already causing problems. Governments are getting in the game, too: Japan is planning to become the first non-Muslim country to issue sharia-compliant bonds; the UK, Gordon Brown announced last summer, is revising its laws to make London the “gateway” for Islamic finance in Europe; and Malaysia has proposed substantial tax incentives in its 2007 budget for its Islamic financial sector.

Deutsche Bank, Chase, and HSBC, the giant London-based financial institution with an extensive presence in Asia, have all entered the sector within the last ten years. Their moves coincide with rising oil prices, echoing a phenomenon three decades ago. When the 1970s oil boom gave Muslims and their governments wealth that seemed barely countable, Islamic financial institutions bloomed: the Islamic Development Bank (1975), the Kuwait Finance house (1977), the Faisal Islamic Bank of Egypt (1977), the Jordan Islamic Bank (1978), and others. In 1979, Bank Misr, a conventional financial house in Egypt, became the first mainstream bank to build a halal subsidiary, which in the late 1990s began to attract more capital than its chief domestic competitor, the Faisal Islamic Bank.

Oil prices and religious fervor are both on the rise again. This time, Western financial firms have noticed that you don’t have to be Islamic to bank in accordance with sharia. All you need is a board of religious scholars to approve your operation. Muslim is as Muslim does.

The Islamic world witnessed the development of corporate contract law and the European banking system from afar.

Hussein Hassan of Deutsche Bank is an example of the sort of expert required. He structures specialized Islamic bonds, or sukuk. For a bond to qualify as sharia-compliant, there must be an underlying asset backing it. One cannot simply issue bonds to raise money, the way it’s been done elsewhere for centuries, in return for a promise of a fixed rate of return. To be Islamic in nature, the securities that look like bonds must represent fractions of an equity asset, rather than fractions of a loan.

According to sharia scholars signing off on the prospectuses, the practices of the multinationals are fully Islamic. That is good news for corporations that want to raise money from Muslims, and for the observant clients themselves. But the potential clientele is by no means captive. As Hassan put it to me, “money always looks for the best deal.” if Islamic finance couldn’t provide results close to those of secular institutions, it wouldn’t exist.

Khalid Ikram, who headed the World Bank’s operations in Egypt in the late 1990s, looked into the performance of Faisal Islamic Bank of Egypt (FIBE) back during the early boom days. It turned out that, despite the bank’s citing “religious fervor” to him as the reason for its growth, Coptic Christians made up about 10 percent of the bank’s clients, just as they do of the country’s population. When returns dropped, so did investment and market share. Egyptians with foreign capital generally preferred to keep their cash overseas, even though the returns there were less than the roughly 20 percent returns FIBE was promising on current accounts. The greater security of foreign deposits made up for their lower rate of return. The rational profit motive never lost its place as the key factor in investor behavior.

Timur Kuran, professor of economics and law at the University of Southern California and author of Islam and Mammon: The Economic Predicaments of Islamism, points out that investing in sharia-compliant fashion doesn’t just buy you decent returns—it can also buy political legitimacy. “Islamic finance didn’t come into its own until the 1970s. Why during the oil boom? Huge amount of assets, petrodollars, were accumulating in the sheikdoms and with the Saudis. These regimes were considered quite illegitimate, and there were a lot of opposition movements, so they wanted to legitimize their regimes and invest the money at the same time…. They could claim that they were promoting Islam and avoiding interest.”

Since the inception of Islamic economics as a distinct discipline in the 20th century, it has always been held up as a champion of ethical development. Islamist writers such as Sayyid Qutb and Sayyid Abul-A’la Maududi envisioned Islamic finance as the economic arm of a new, sharia-guided political order. Free of the scourge of interest, the instrument by which fat-cat colonial and imperial capitalists make money from money, Islamic financial institutions would effectively become private equity or venture capital firms, providing sorely needed investment and support for the region’s economy. By investing in Islamic finance, you weren’t just being pious—you were aiding development and helping the poor as well.

But the post-capitalist utopia that reliance on these instruments was meant to inaugurate was dead on arrival. Those involved in the first wave of Islamic banks realized that equity financing does not make for a stable banking sector, and, after a series of shocks and bad investments, they became very conservative. It was a race to the loopholes—a search for means of sharia compliance less risky than straight-out equity investing.

The chief loophole was murabaha. Let’s say that you, a small businessman, wish to go into business selling cars. A conventional bank would examine your credit history and, if all was acceptable, grant you a cash loan. You would incur an obligation to return the funds on a specific maturity date, paying interest each month along the way. When you signed the note and made the promise, you would use the proceeds to buy the cars—and meet your other expenses—yourself. But in a murabaha transaction, instead of just cutting you the check, the bank itself would buy the cars. You promise to buy them from the bank at a higher price on a future date—like a futures contract in the commodities market. The markup is justified by the fact that, for a period, the bank owns the property, thus assuming liability. At no point in the transaction is money treated as a commodity, as it is in a normal loan.

But here’s the catch: most Muslim scholars agree that there is no minimum time interval for the bank to own the property before selling it to you at the markup. According to Timur Kuran, the typical interval is “under a millisecond.” The bank transfers ownership of the asset to its client right away. The client still pays a fixed markup at a later date, a payment that is usually secured by some sort of collateral or by other forms of contractual coercion. Thus, in practice, murabaha is a normal loan.

Since murabaha must be asset-based, however, it can’t help a small businessman who needs a working-capital loan, for example, to provide cash on hand to meet payroll or other expenses. To get such capital from an Islamic financial institution, an entrepreneur would have to sell the bank an equity interest in his business. This is far riskier for the bank and thus much harder to obtain.

The experts tell me that every Islamic bank has at least three-quarters of its investments structured as murabaha. Even the inaptly named Islamic Development Bank was, as of the mid-1980s, doing four-fifths of its business through murabaha, and only 1 percent through equity transactions.

What the “Islamic” label might mean is left to the beholder. The sharia scholars make it their business to pronounce only upon the letter of the law. Like legal practitioners everywhere, they focus on the technicalities. The spirit, being intangible, tends not to cloud their rulings. The leading critics of this inconsistency are political Islamists themselves. Majed Jarrar, a personable young man who studies electrical engineering, wears a long beard, and is keen to discuss his faith, recently opened an account with FIBE here in Cairo, only to let it sit empty. He’s been investigating whether “it’s actually Islamic or not,” and he doesn’t like what he’s finding.

When I asked him about the sort of innovation that, for example, Hussein Hassan at Deutsche Bank is involved in, Majed scoffed. Recalling a similar campaign by a Gulf-based Islamic financial house (“creative Islamic Solutions” was the slogan), Majed argued that sharia law is less about innovation than it is about a return to the ways of seventh-century Arabia.

Despite the zeal of purists like Jarrar, an entire banking sector without debt would be far too unstable. Such a system has never had to exist—medieval Islam had extensive regulations governing trade relations and individual contract law, but there was no banking, so there were no banking rules.

While no one I interviewed argued that sharia-compliant financing directly retards economic and social development, there was agreement that it does much less than the original rhetoric claimed. Not only are working-capital loans, critical to many small businesses, rare, but also sharia-compliant transactions tend to be short-term.

Still, there’s something reassuring about the way that the rational profit motive trumps strict ideology. The willingness to put profit first is, it turns out, the real shared value that links Islamic and Western civilizations.

Aaron MacLean lives in Cairo. From 2003 to 2006 he was a Marshall Scholar at Oxford University, where he researched medieval Arabic thought.